The general rule is that a contract made in violation of a law that provides for the licensing of persons engaged in certain occupations, is void. *Bowdre* v. *Carter*, 64 Miss. 221; *Stanwood* v. *Woodward*, 38 Me. 192; *Stevenson* v. *Ewing*, 3 Pickle 46; but the contrary has also been held in similar cases. *Shepler* v. *Scott*, 85 Pa. St. 329; *Jones* v. *Berry*, 23 N. H. 209. Though in most States laws similar to the present one provide that there shall be no recovery for services rendered in violation thereof, yet it would not seem to be necessary, especially where the statute expressly says that a violation of it shall be deemed a misdemeanor. *Orr* v. *Meek*, 111 Ind. 40; *Ingersoll* v. *Randall*, 14 Minn. 304.

RAILROADS—NEGLIGENCE—TRESPASSER ON TRACK—INFANTS—CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.—TRUDELL V. GRAND TRUNK RY. CO., 85 N. W. 250 (Mich.).—A boy seven years and four months old was killed by the defendant's train. The court submitted the proposition of the negligence of the boy to the jury. *Held*, that it was error to submit the question of his contributory negligence to the jury.

This case seems to contradict a mass of decisions which hold that it is a question of fact for the jury whether a child exercised the ordinary care and diligence which is expected from a child similarly situated. 7 *Am. and Eng. Ency. Law* (Second Ed.), 409; *Evansick* v. *Gulf, etc., Ry. Co.*, 57 Tex. 126; *Railroad Co.* v. *Stout*, 17 Wallace 664. All these cases refer to accidents at crossings, while in the case at bar, the child was a trespasser on the tracks. There is sharp conflict among the authorities as to what the duty of a railroad company is to children who come upon its premises as trespassers, but the court holds to the general rule that a railroad company is no more bound to keep its premises safe for children, who are trespassers, than it is to keep them safe for adults. *Elliott on Railroads*, Sec. 1259.

SIDEWALKS—SPECIAL TAX—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.—JOB ET AL. V. CITY OF ALTON, 59 N. E. 622 (Ill.)—A city ordinance under a statute provided for the construction of a sidewalk by the owners, the expense to be borne in proportion to frontage. The city constructed a sidewalk for the delinquent plaintiff and levied against his property. *Held*, that, though the statute did not provide for an assessment in proportion to the benefit accruing to the land from the sidewalk, U. S. Constitution, Amend. 14, was not thereby violated, since the ordinance was not unreasonable or oppressive.

The leading case on which the plaintiff relied is *Village of Norwood* v. *Baker*, 172 U. S. 269, where it was held that an assessment for the construction of a street whose cost was in substantial excess of the benefit conferred upon the abutting land was void. This case was also applied in *Dexter* v. *City of Boston*, 57 N. E. 379. But the court pointed out that these two cases brought extreme hardship upon the property-owner and plainly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision, nevertheless, practically reiterates that of the *Norwood* case; for "*unreasonable and oppressive*" is but the application of adjectives to "*a cost of construction in substantial excess of the benefit conferred.*" Unjust assessments have been previously held void in Illinois. See *Hawes* v. *City of Chicago*, 158 Ill. 653; *Craw* v. *Village of Tolono*, 96 Ill. 252.

STREET RAILWAYS—RIDING ON PLATFORM—NOTICE FORBIDDING.—SWEETLAND V. LYNN AND B. R. CO., 59 N. E. 443 (Mass.).—Where a notice on a street car forbade persons riding on front platform, but, the car being crowded, the plaintiff and many others rode there and sustained injuries, *held*, that the defendant by habitually allowing passengers to ride on the front platform and collecting fares from them waived the prohibition.